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Abstract
We consider an innovation game in which the role of each player is well-defined: first an
innovator invests, followed by a second firm that can be an imitator or an improver. However,
if we introduce legal requirements that followers have to respect (for instance patents), the
role are formally reversed; innovators behave like followers since the decision of the second
firm is already (partially) fixed. We cross this observation with the fact that firms’ investment
decisions can be detrimental or beneficial to rivals and partners. For instance, the innovators
can be hurt by the imitator’s investment, and the imitator may benefit from the innovator’s
investment, due to spillover effects. In this setting depending on the spillover effects we
investigate whether innovators over or under invest when there exist local limitations to
imitation and improvement of innovations.
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1 Introduction
The innovation game is a complex dynamic process where no one can truly assert that his brand
new product or her cost-killer method comes out of nothing. All innovators benefit from former
research efforts, either private or public, either access-free or protected by property rights.1 In
some cases, the innovation is Pareto improving because it does not hurt the benefits of any
incumbent and it can even be a good opportunity to improve the spectrum of services provided
by some ancient products or to decrease its production and/or use cost. But in many cases,
the innovation is detrimental for some agents. It can be mildly detrimental when it marginally
infringes the claims of some property-right owner. In this case, the right-owner can tolerate the
presence of a competing product if it is sufficiently differentiated because fighting commercially
or legally against entry would cost more than the lost revenues. The innovation can strongly
hurt the benefits of some incumbent when it is a mere copy of the incumbent’s product (and
it should not be called an ‘innovation’). It can even result in the exclusion of a former seller
when the innovation is the drastic improvement of an ancient product or process. Because
today’s entrants are tomorrow’s incumbents, innovators can rationally anticipate the threat of
lost revenues due to entry and play strategically. For instance, an innovator who cannot benefit
from a good protection against copying has an incentive to underinvest. Symmetrically, an
innovator who expects complementary discoveries that will increase his benefits has an incentive
to overinvest.2 This explains why the conventional framework for the economic analysis of
intertemporal competition between an innovator and his potential competitors is a sequential
game where the innovator decides on his effort anticipating the reaction function of future
entrants.
The trade-off between the advantages for society of a high innovation activity and the mostly
private cost of the effort to innovate ineluctably pushes governments to intervene in the innova-
tion process. The most common intervention consists in the definition of property rights that
will allow private investors to harvest the profits generated by their effort rather than to share
those profits with free riders. For candidates to entry (either mere copiers or true improvers),
1The ‘cumulativeness’ of innovations is analyzed in Scotchmer (1999). “We are like dwarfs on the shoulders
of giants so that we can see more than they, and things at a greater distance not by virtue of any sharpness of
sight on our part, or any physical distinction but because we are carried high and raised up by their giant size”,
is attributed to Bernard de Chartres, a philosopher of the 12th century.
2O’Donoghue, Scotchmer and Thisse (1998) study a dynamic game where improvements arise randomly. They
show that, if the protection against imitation is perfect whereas the protection against improvement is not,
innovators tend to overinvest or underinvest, depending on the rate at which ideas occur to innovators. If ideas
are too frequent, innovators cannot fully benefit from their innovations, and thus tend to underinvest. On the
other hand, if they are not that frequent, firms tend to overinvest.
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it means that they will have to step over administrative or economic thresholds in order to be
accepted. For example, the novelty requirement obliges challengers to invest in ‘non-imitation’
much more than what they intended to do. They will not be allowed to enter if they do not
differentiate their product sufficiently.3 But this type of requirement has an effect that, so far,
has not been analyzed in the literature on R&D: each time the legal requirement is binding,
newcomers are not really reacting to the investment decisions of the innovator. Their own ‘re-
search’ expenditures are fixed by law or regulation. Actually, we can even say that the roles are
reversed. When the innovator already knows what the followers will have to spend because of
legal restrictions, he is the true follower. It results that the question to know whether it is a good
incentive for innovators to have a strict regulation by means of patents, copyrights and all the
variety of intellectual property rights can (partially) be restated as “When does the innovator
invest more? When he is the leader of the innovation game or when he behaves like a follower?”
The paper analyzes this problem using an elementary model of competition between two
firms when there exist spillovers between their profit functions.
Contrary to the patent race literature where firms compete to be the first to make the same
discovery (Reinganum, 1989), we consider that some firms make innovations, whereas other firms
follow on the innovators. Consequently, these firms do not compete for the same discoveries, and
they play very different roles in the dynamic process of innovation. We thus depart from this
literature as we study the investment decisions when there is no race. Our approach is closer
to the ‘cumulative’ approach in which innovation builds upon previous discoveries (Scotchmer,
1999, O’Donoghue, Scotchmer and Thisse, 1998). However, we do not adopt the random dynamic
structure of O’Donoghue et al. (1998). We simply assume that after an innovation has been made
the follower observes it and decides how much to invest in imitation. The role of each player is
well defined: the leader innovates and the follower imitates, develops or improves. Furthermore
we implicitly assume that the patent protection is imperfect, as imitation is legal within certain
limits. This has first been studied by Gallini (1992) who determines the appropriate protection
against imitation as well as the optimal duration of the patent in order to prevent imitation.
However, it is not necessarily the case that entry should be prevented. If there exist positive
externalities that flow from the innovator (respectively the follower) to the follower (respectively
the innovator), entry, even an imitation, can boost innovation rather than being detrimental.
We explore the incidence of negative and positive externalities on the investment decision of
innovators and followers.
3 In Scotchmer and Green (1990), it is argued that a ‘strong’ novelty requirement that limits the number
of patentable improvements can be socially better than a ‘weak’ novelty requirement because it gives greater
incentives to race and the race accelerates progress.
3
The paper is organized as follows. The hypothesis are exposed in section 2. Section 3 gives
the details of the equilibria with and without exogenous constraint in four cases. These cases
correspond to the configurations where the innovator benefits or suffers from the competitor’s
investment combined with those where the competitor benefits or suffers from the innovator’s
investment. In order to keep a coherent view of the problem, we mainly restrict the illustrations
of the four configurations to the Information and Communication Industry, namely the music
industry, the software industry, the hardware industry and the video game industry. In section
4, we discuss several alternative explanations for research spillover and we consider the merger
(or joint venture) solution. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
The players:
We consider a sequential model with two firms: an innovator (I) and a potential entrant (E).
Both have to invest in order to develop their products but E is a follower, which means that she
will be second to choose, after observing the choice of I and her choice will be constrained by some
Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs). Let us denote by xI the investment decision of I. We assume
that there is no uncertainty concerning the innovation and that it is introduced and patented at
the same moment. The potential entrant (or follower) observes the investment decision made by
the innovator (through the innovation that has been brought about) and decides how much to
invest in imitation or development. Let us denote xE this imitation or development decision. In
order to keep the model as general as possible we do not precisely specify the imitation decision.
It can be a differentiation decision (how far from the existing product the follower wants her
product to be), an improvement decision (how better the follower wants her product compared
to the initial product), or an application decision (how many applications the follower wants to
introduce in the market). As we are mainly interested in the impact of the investment decision
of one firm on the decision of the other firm, we simply consider the following reduced profit
functions for each firm:4
VI(xI , xE) = xI −
(xI)
2
2
+ ηIxIxE (1)
VE(xE, xI) = xE −
(xE)
2
2
+ ηExIxE (2)
4These profit functions are to be viewed as the profit faced by the decision makers at the first stage of a two-
stage game where the second stage equilibrium has been solved. See for instance d’Aspremont and Jacquemin
(1988), where firms first engage in cost-reducing R&D and then compete in quantities on a homogeneous good
market. In Motta (1992), first R&D is aimed at increasing the quality of products, then firms compete on a
differentiated good market.
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where ηi (i = I, E) represents a spillover effect that can take positive or negative values, with
|ηE | < 1 , |ηI | < 1 and ηEηI < 1/2. As ηI = ∂
2VI(.)
∂xE∂xI
and ηE =
∂2VE(.)
∂xE∂xI
, when ηI (respectively ηE)
is positive, the innovator (respectively the follower) benefits from the effort of the other firm. On
the contrary, ηI (respectively ηE) negative corresponds to a negative externality borne by the
innovator (respectively the follower). In the literature about knowledge externalities, spillovers
are in general positive externalities as they indicate the transmission of useful information. They
can be included in the final cost reduction and be symmetric (D’Aspremont and Jacquemin,
1988), asymmetric (De Bondt and Henriques, 1995), or they can intervene in each firm’s final
R&D investment (Kamien, Muller and Zang, 1992). Most of the findings in these studies depend
on the size of those spillovers: they can be small or large compared to a certain cut-off value (that
is model-dependent). Here, we do not specify where the externalities intervene, and thus we
consider that spillovers can be either positive or negative. Loosely stated what we call “negative
spillovers” correspond to small spillovers in the literature, whereas “positive spillovers” would
correspond to large spillovers.
The regulation:
However, the follower is constrained by patent or copyright laws or specific regulations to
respect some market boundaries. In our elementary setting these constraints will be modelled
as investment requirements. If for instance the follower invests to differentiate her product, the
government can oblige her to invest at least a minimum level, say xE. Indeed, when he receives
a patent, the innovator is being granted the right to protect a defined segment of the market (if
we consider horizontal differentiation) or a certain number of applications, or improved versions
of his product (if we consider vertical differentiation). Symmetrically, it can be the case that
there exists some upper limit xE that the entrant is not allowed to exceed because it would be
viewed as an obvious infringement of the innovator’s rights.5 Consequently, the entrant has to
respect the constraints xE ≤ xE, and / or xE ≥ xE. In centrally planned systems, we would
have xE = xE so that entrants would have no choice at all since all R&D decisions are controlled
by one unique principal. An alternative restriction could be an exclusion zone xE /∈ [xE, xE].
This would mean that entry is accommodated only either if the challenger operates on small
scale which does not deprive the innovator of large benefits or on the contrary if she invests
large amounts of money, which could represent an improvement detrimental for the incumbent
but beneficial for consumers. The exclusion zone is the one that best corresponds to the patent
system. However, in order to keep the model as simple as possible, we will only consider the
two following elementary restrictions: either xE ≤ xE or xE ≥ xE and we will analyze the
consequences of a change in xE or xE on the investment of the innovator.
5When xE = 0, entry is totally forbidden.
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Alternative equilibria:
The best unconstrained choice of the follower is
xE(xI) = 1 + ηExI (3)
since she knows xI at the time she makes her decision.
Anticipating the reaction function (3), the best choice of the innovator is
x∗I = arg{−xI + 1 + ηI [xE(xI) + xI
dxE(xI)
dxI
] = 0}. (4)
We consider three alternative cases:
1. The benchmark case in which entry is prohibited or technically impossible (either because
xE = 0 or xE is too big
6) so that xE ≡ 0. Let
xmI = 1 (5)
denote the investment in R&D made by the unchallenged monopoly.
2. The second case corresponds to constrained choices by the followers, because either xE(xI) <
xE or xE(xI) > xE. Depending on the value of the exogenous requirement, the paten-
tholder will choose
either xI = 1 + ηIxE or xI = 1 + ηIxE . (6)
Let bxI(xE) be the best choice of the innovator when he anticipates dxE/dxI ≡ 0. In
particular, we have bxI(xE) = xI and bxI(xE) = xI .
3. We now turn to the case where the follower observes the value of xI and can choose
xE without any restriction. She therefore reacts according to
dxE(xI)
dxI
= ηE . Using this
information, from (4) we can write x∗I as a best anticipation to xE
xI(xE) =
1 + ηIxE
1− ηEηI
. (7)
In the absence of binding requirement, the equilibrium levels of investment in the sequential
6There exists a cut-off value xmaxE such that, for any xE > x
max
E the follower never enters as her payoff becomes
negative.
6
game are7
x∗I =
1 + ηI
1− 2ηEηI
, (8)
x∗E =
1 + ηE(1− ηI)
1− 2ηEηI
. (9)
These equilibrium levels vary with the spillover parameters in a non-trivial manner.8 The
equilibrium level of investment of each firm i, x∗i for i = E, I depends on its “own” spillover
parameter, i.e., ηi as well as on the spillover parameter of the other firm, i.e., ηj for j 6= i and
j = E, I. We thus investigate how each equilibrium investment varies with the two spillover
effects. The investment of the entrant is always increasing with ηE, for any value of ηI ∈ (−1, 1)
as ∂x∗E/∂ηE = (1 + ηI)/(1− 2ηEηI)2. This increasing relationship does not hold any longer for
the equilibrium investment of the innovator. Indeed, it increases with ηI only for high values of
ηE, i.e., ηE > −1/2 as ∂x∗I/∂ηI = (1 + 2ηE)/(1− 2ηEηI)2. For very negative values of ηE, i.e.,
ηE < −1/2, the innovator invests less as ηI increases. This is due to the sequential structure of
our game.
We now investigate how the equilibrium levels of investment change after a change in the
other spillover parameter. The investment of the entrant increases with ηI either for small values
of ηE < −1/2 or for positive values of ηE, as ∂x∗E/∂ηI = ηE(1 + 2ηE)/(1− 2ηEηI)2. For values
of ηE ∈ (−1/2, 0), the equilibrium level of investment of the entrant decreases with ηI . Finally,
the equilibrium investment of the innovator is increasing (respectively decreasing) with ηE if
ηI < 0 (respectively ηI > 0) as ∂x
∗
I/∂ηE = −2ηI(1 + ηI)/(1− 2ηEηI)2.
It is clear that the comparison of the optimal investments of the innovator given by (5), (6),
and (8) depends on the sign of the spillover parameters ηE and ηI .
We now detail four configurations that we classify according to the relevance of both signs
for a specific branch of the ICT industry. For instance, ηE > 0 and ηI > 0 corresponds to an
industry where both externalities are positive: the more the innovator (respectively the follower)
invests, the higher the profit of the follower (respectively the innovator). This corresponds to the
externalities that arise in the computer industry where I stands for the microprocessor producers
and E represents the software developers. They both benefit from the effort of the other.
7Solving (3) and (4) gives the same result as solving the system of equations (3) and (7). We use the latter
method which has the advantage to allow a direct graphical comparison of the investment levels when the game
is sequential and when the game is simultaneous. The same kind of trick can be used to solve the Stackelberg
equilibrium where a leader and a follower compete in quantities to sell an homogenous product.
8Amir et alii (2001) show that the equilibrium R&D level is decreasing in the spillover parameter but, in their
model, the parameter is defined at the production stage as information sharing to decrease costs while in our
model the spillover parameters are shortcuts for all the interactions between firms at all stages.
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3 Industry-specific Externalities
In this section we consider the innovation game in the industry of ICTs. We successively consider
the four cases where ηE and ηI can be both positive, or both negative or can have opposite signs.
3.1 The Music Industry
We first consider the case where the follower benefits from the research of the innovator (ηE > 0)
but the presence of the imitator is harmful to the innovator (ηI < 0). This case corresponds to
the traditional model of imitation, where imitation (respectively innovation) creates a negative
(respectively positive) externality on the innovator’s profit (respectively the imitator’s profit).
Because ηI < 0, when facing the threat of imitation we can see in Figure 1 that the innovator
has a natural incentive to invest less than when there is no such threat (x∗I < x
m
I ). But this
is the unconstrained equilibrium of the sequential game. As an innovator, firm I is protected
against too large (xE ≤ xE) or too small investment (xE ≥ xE) of the challenger. Do these
limits help the innovator to keep a high level of investment?
The requirement to invest at least xE is binding only when xE > x
∗
E. It has an adverse effect
on the innovator’s profit who is obliged to increase his R&D investment (bxI(xE) > x∗I) at least
as long as xE is not too large. For a very large requirement xE, the effort of the incumbent
is less than x∗I . Actually, as can be seen in figure 1 and figure 2, when xE ≥ xE is imposed,
the R&D expenditure of the innovator expressed as a function of xE is discontinuous at point
x∗E. This is because imposing such a constraint is like changing the timing of the game. The
regulated value of the follower expenditure xE is fixed before the innovator expenditure xI .
6
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Figure 1: Research efforts in the music industry (ηE > 0, ηI < 0)
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Figure 3: Effect of a maximum
requirement on xE for
the innovation expenditures
Symmetrically, from figures 1 and 3 we see that the upper limit xE ≤ xE has a positive effect
on the investment of the innovator (bxI(xE) > x∗I for xE < x∗E) but it cannot give the innovator
an incentive to invest more than when there is no imitator at all (bxI(xE) ≤ xmI ).
This case is the benchmark for the defenders of intellectual property rights: all efforts by
the innovator are good for imitators, whereas the former suffers from the activity of the latter.
***********
A very tough IPRs policy that prohibits entry (if, for instance, entry becomes prohibitively
costly, i.e., xE very large, or if entry is prohibited xE = 0) allows the innovator to invest at the
monopoly level. This level is higher than what he would have invested if a very lenient IPRs
policy was enforced (i.e., for xE < x
∗
E) or even if the policy was tougher and entry was just
restricted (for xE > x
∗
E but not too high). So, from the innovator’s viewpoint, a very tough
IPRs policy induces more innovation by preventing imitation. However, any IPRs policy that
permits entry (restricted or not) allows to increase the total sum of the investments made by
firms. Thus, from a strict society’s viewpoint, it is not clear whether a very tough policy that
completely prevents entry is better than a softer requirement that allows to speed up imitation,
or eventually improvement. As long as the former innovator gets enough benefit to cover his
investment, imitation may be beneficial to society.
***********
The music industry is a good illustration of this situation. At the beginning of 2000, Nap-
ster developed a program to download MP3 files. In less than six months the music industry
i) incurred losses evaluated at $ 20m and ii) sued Napster at law to obtain the withdrawal of
9
the program needed for downloading. Music companies argued that given the copy (imitation)
activity encouraged by Napster-like firms, their expenditures in new talents research and record-
ing activity would drop dramatically (say from xmI to x
∗
I). The demand for withdrawal and the
decision taken by courts in 2001 consist in the tentative to go back to xmI . Napster has now
disappeared but it has been replaced by many newcomers.9 From the figures, we see that if the
public objective is to keep the effort of I as high as possible, the best policy is to fix xE = 0.
An innovation can also be severely damaged by dramatic improvements. All the history
of the software industry is made of first movers excluded from the market by a drastically
improved version of their product: Word, Excel, Explorer and Outlook have replaced respectively
WordPerfect, Lotus 1-2-3, Netscape and Eudora as dominant applications.10 This extreme case
is illustrated by the case where ηI is close to −1. From (8) and (9) we see that this results in
the bankruptcy of the innovator (x∗I → 0) and its replacement by the follower (x∗E → 1 = xmE ).
In this case, it would be inefficient to protect I.
3.2 The Software Industry
We now consider the case where the innovator benefits from the research of the follower, and,
reciprocally, the follower benefits from the efforts of the innovator (ηE > 0 and ηI > 0). Follow-
ing the ‘conventional’ definition of Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer (1985), the investment
decisions of the firms are strategic complements.
If the follower is allowed to freely enter the market the investment made by the innovator is
non-ambiguously higher than the investment of the innovator when he is not threatened by any
imitator: we see from figure 4 that x∗I > x
m
I . In this case the expected presence of the follower
boosts innovation: the innovator has high incentives to invest more since he will later benefit
from the efforts of the follower.
Now if x∗E < xE, we also have xI(xE) > x
m
I by transitivity.
11 But xI(xE) can be larger
or smaller than x∗I depending on the slopes of bxI(xE) and xI(xE) and on the value of xE. If
the minimum investment requirement xE is larger than but close to x
∗
E, we see that the R&D
expenditure of the innovator is lower than without the xE requirement.
Because of the discontinuity in the innovator’s investment created by the legal restriction
imposed to the follower (xE ≥ xE or xE ≤ xE) if the government wants to foster R&D efforts
9See www.afternapster.com.
10The idea that the four Microsoft’s products are technically better than their predecessors is developed in
Leibowitz and Margolis (2001). Some authors challenge this idea and consider that Microsoft won the battle by
its marketing policy (mainly forced bundling) rather than on technical grounds; see Gilbert and Katz (2001).
11As xI(xE) is an increasing function. The reader can easily draw the graphs of xI(xE) and xI(xE) correspond-
ing to figure 4 like we did with figures 2 and 3 that correspond to figure 1.
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by imposing a minimal constraint on followers, this constraint is to be very stringent, namely
xE ≥ bx−1I (x∗I) = 1+2ηE1−2ηEηI . Clearly, a maximum requirement xE ≤ xE would not be a good idea
either since the effort of I is increasing with xE. At most, the innovator will invest x∗I . At worst
(when xE < x∗E), he will invest bxI(xE) < x∗I .
*********
A very tough IPRs policy has a negative impact on investments as a monopoly always
invests less than competitive firms. In this case it is clear that competition boosts innovation.
Furthermore, the total sum of investments is always higher under IPRs policies that allow entry.
*********
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Figure 4: Research efforts in the software industry (ηE > 0, ηI > 0)
This parameter configuration can be observed in the software industry where developers of
operating systems (OS) benefit from the expenditures of applications’ publishers (ηI > 0) and
symmetrically, the applications’ publishers benefit from the financial effort of the OS developers
(ηE > 0). Consequently if we just want to increase the OS research expenditure, it is better not
to impose any minimum constraint on the effort of the applications’ publishers if it is a mild
constraint. Indeed a constraint xE ≥ xE where xE is slightly above x∗E would have the adverse
effect of decreasing xI . Alternative solutions to increase xI are to encourage joint venture and
to organize a merger between the OS and application producers as we will see in section 4. But
the simplest obvious to policy is to leave this type of industry without any restriction to the
entrant’s decisions.
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3.3 The Hardware Industry
Consider now that the follower does not benefit from the innovator (ηE < 0) while the latter
benefits from the entrant’s effort (ηI > 0).
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Figure 5: Research efforts in the hardware industry (ηE < 0, ηI > 0)
Because of the negative externality they suffer from the innovator (ηE < 0), the follower is
somewhat reluctant to invest. By contrast, the innovator would like her to increase her research
efforts. A minimal requirement xE ≥ xE above x∗E is a good incentive to develop the innovator’s
effort since bxI(xE) > xmI for all xE > x∗E.
************
An IPRs policy that prevents entry induces the innovator to invest more only if the negative
externality of the follower is very large (i.e., ηE < −0.5). Otherwise, competition tends to boost
innovation. For any value of the spillovers, the total sum of investment is always higher under
competition than if it prohibited. However, a policy that restricts entry (i.e., xE > x
∗
E) allows
to increase the investment of the innovator as well as the total sum of the investments.
************
In industries with strong network externalities, innovators benefit from a large users base.
They face a trade-off to let imitators enter. On one hand, they benefit from additional users
but, on the other hand, they lose in unit sales. A good example is the hardware industry where
innovators (brand firms) may have advantage in letting “clones” be in the market. For instance
Sun Microsystem, has encouraged clones of its computer workstation to build its technology’s
12
user base (Conner (1995)). Those consumers who favour higher quality, have a preference for
the branded hardware. As the innovator invests in providing cheaper computer workstations,
the demand for clones decreases and thus it hurts the imitator (ηE < 0). On the other hand,
the introduction of clones allows the user base to grow, so the innovator gains from letting the
imitator be in the market (ηI > 0). Thus imitation boosts innovation. It is even more dramatic
if the imitation is restricted: the innovator invests more than without the minimum or maximum
requirement imposed to the imitator.
3.4 The Video Game Industry
In many industries, the follower suffers from the innovator (ηE < 0) and the latter suffers
from the former (ηI < 0). In this case, the investment decisions of the two firms are strategic
substitutes.
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Figure 6: Research efforts in the video-game industry (ηE < 0, ηI < 0)
As compared with the case where the innovator does not suffer from any imitation (ηI = 0
and thus x∗I = x
m
I ), when ηI < 0 we see that the presence of the imitator has the effect to
increase (respectively decrease the innovator’s effort) as ηE < −1/2 (respectively ηE > −1/2).
Once more, the introduction of a minimum requirement on xE has the effect to create a
downward jump in xI at point x∗E. But contrary to the former case, an additional increase in
xE provokes a decrease in xI(xE). Therefore, to fix a minimal threshold for the investment by
imitators is always detrimental for the efforts of the innovator.
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When ηE is very small (ηE < −1/2), the innovator is inclined to overinvesting (x∗I > xmI )
because she knows that this is armful to imitators who will invest less. Consequently, if the
government fixes xE > x
∗
E, this dissuasive policy does not work any longer. On the contrary, we
observe that xI(xE) is less than x
m
I for xE > x
∗
E. The requirement xE that can be viewed as
the investment that measures the novelty of an improvement on the initial innovation provides
a negative incentive to innovate. The higher xE, the lower is the incentive to spend money on
the initial innovation: xE is like a barrier that protects the innovator.
*************
Thus, a tough IPRs policy allows the innovator to invest more only if the follower’s negative
externality is very strong (ηE < −1/2). When entry is just restricted, the innovator does not
invest more. Here again competition induces firms to investment more compared to what a
monopoly would do.
************
In industries where the leader and the follower have different standards, the more the leader
invests in an innovation that promotes his standards, the less the follower benefits from it
(ηE < 0). On the other hand, the more the follower invests in an innovation that is compatible
with her own standard, the lower the profit of the leader (ηI < 0). Innovators invest more
in presence of competitors. The competition between Nintendo and Sega is relevant for this
specific case. Indeed, every time Nintendo invents a new game, Sega loses consumers. Then
Sega invests to produce a similar-kind of game that will be detrimental to Nintendo.12 If the
government intervenes and forces Sega to artificially differentiate its product for instance, it
will reduce innovations, instead of boosting them. In fact each firm will compete in different
markets.
The present fight for digital dominance between Microsoft and Nokia in the mobile phones
market is another illustration of this case of technological competition.13
12Concerning the study of standards as well as the competition between Nintendo and Sega, see Shapiro and
Varian (1999).
13See The Economist, November 21, 2002.
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4 The internalization of spillovers14
In the innovation game, each player in his turn appears as the leader.15 The strategies are
so intricate that the game is a complex combination of simultaneous, sequential and collusive
behaviors. Each player should also take into account the likelihood of positive and negative
externalities. In the short run, the sign of the spillover coefficients can be forecast reasonably
well but in the medium run it is much harder. An additional reason is that all actual candi-
dates to innovation and innovators are simultaneously facing actual and would-be providers of
complement and substitute products, not just one like in our model. The incentives to integrate
horizontally and vertically and to take the control of ally or competitor start-ups are driven
by the sake of internalization. For example, in November 2002, Comcast (a cable operator)
merged with AT&T Broadband to create a giant of the US media and communication industry
(22m subscribers). The objective of the merger is to stop customers leaving: during the nine
first months of 2002, some 0.6m left (most of them from AT&T Broadband) to satellite TV
which is cheaper. Joining the efforts of the two companies would eventually allow to diversify
into activities more profitable than cable TV broadcasting and to propose services that satel-
lite rivals cannot match, namely broadband internet access, interactive television and national
cable-telephone.16
The spillover effect at work in the former sections can have several origins and different
materializations: technological, legal, marketing.17
[To be completed]
14For a survey on R&D cooperation, see DeBondt (1997).
15 “Sony, the world’s largest consumer-electronics maker is under constant assault from a host of new competi-
tors, with Samsung leading the pack. The one clear advantage Sony has had is its strong brand image, which is
still the global electronics brand to beat. But now, that edge is being blunted.(...). Samsung has quickly gained
technical prowess and is learning the Sony-pioneered art of turning gadgets into fashion accessories. Now it is
building a brand. In 2002, Samsung has spent more than $900 million world-wide on branding activities such as
television ads and retail promotions, compared with $700 million last year.”
Sony must now “introduce new products first in markets where Samsung is strongest,” says Sony President
Kunitake Ando. “They’ve learned so much from us. ... Now they’re becoming a much bigger influence on our
strategy”. From the Wall Street Journal Europe, December 20-22, 2002.
16Additionally, “Comcast has a foot in the content business through the QVC home shopping channel, its Hello!-
style entertainment channel, E!, and the Golf Channel. Its latest project is G4, a channel for video games. With
its enlarged customer base, Comcast will become a powerful partner for those looking to launch new services. ‘The
beauty of having 21.5m customers is for ourselves or other companies or entrepreneurs to enable their business
plans,’ Mr Robert (the Comcast’s president) says.” From the Financial Times, December 20, 2002.
17 In d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), knowledge spills over after the end of the R&D process, i.e., spillover
relates to R&D outputs. By contrast, in Kamien et al. (1992) knowledge spills over during the R&D process, i.e.,
spillover relates to R&D inputs. In our model, we cannot distinguish between the two types of spillover.
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Like in many other sequential decision processes, the participants to the innovation game
suffer sort of intertemporal schizophrenia. When they are candidates to entry they would like to
face doors wide open. Later, the winners of the race will argue that doors should be kept tightly
closed. Let us remain within our model where the decision variables are investment in R&D, not
legal arrangements that are exogenous. Because of the aforementioned evolution of the players’
interests a complete description of the innovation game should require that entrants internalize
their expected behavior as future incumbent. If they do so, their objective is to maximize
VE(xE, xI) + ρVI(xE, xI) where ρ stands for both the discount factor and the probability to be
the next incumbent. Such a forward-looking entrant facing no competition (except herself in
the future) would choose to invest today up to
x
f
E = 1 +
(ηE + ρηI)(ρ+ ηE + ηI)
ρ− (ηE + ρηI)2
which internalizes the future spillover of her today decisions as well as the effects of the future
decisions on the profits from the today decisions. With perfect internalization (ρ = 1), we obtain
a today’s investment
x
f
E =
1
1− (ηE + ηI)
where the only thing that matters is the net value of the spillover coefficients ηE + ηI .
If the entrant perfectly internalizes her future status, she is behaving like if a joint venture. It
can be the case that spillovers compensate each other, so that xfE = 1 when they have opposite
signs. But when they have the same sign, they induce either a greater effort when the two
activities are complements (ηE and ηI positive) or a smaller effort when they are substitute
(ηE and ηI negative).
In a perfect joint venture, it is easy to check that the present investment of each partner is18
x
f
E = x
f
I =
1
1− (ηE + ηI)
How does the total R&D expenditure xfE + x
f
I compare with the total effort in the leader-
follower game? Using (8) and (9), we can establish that
sign
n
x
f
E + x
f
I − (x
∗
E + x
∗
I)
o
≡ sign {ηI(1 + ηI) + ηE(1 + ηE)− ηIηE(1 + ηE + ηI}
18Actually, in the literature on cooperative research, the standard hypothesis is that the spillover coefficients
are higher when firms cooperate (the coefficients are indices of (“information exchange”) than when they do not
cooperate (“information leakage”). See for example Katz (1986), Motta (1992).
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If both parameters are negative (and less than 1 in absolute value), the effect of the joint
venture is to decrease the total effort. If they are positive (and ηEηI < 1/2) the total effort is
increased19. The sign is not clearly established in all the other cases.
6
- ηE
1
1
-1
-1
ηI
ηEηI < 1/2
One case where the net value of the spillover coefficients of each firm (taking into account
all the positive and negative externalities resulting from technological constraints and market
conditions) is most likely positive is when firms have to decide on an industry-wide standard.
For example, since 1999, hundreds of firms in the telecom industry support Voice XML
(for Voice eXtensible Mark-up Language) as a common language for all the voice applications.
Nowadays, when we want to obtain traffic information or to check bank accounts by phone
without the intervention of a live operator, we are limited to pushing some buttons or using a
predefined vocabulary. These flaws obviously impair the profitability of this type of activity. To
develop it necessitates drastic progress in speech recognition. This is the objective of the Voice
XML, pushed by the main firms of the telecom industry within World Wide Web Consortium
(W3C), an Internet standards body.20 The industry members all expect lower costs (saving on
live operators) and higher demand (due to easier and more rapid information).
19This is the case usually analyzed in the economic literature, in particular by d’Aspremont and Jacquemin
(1988).
20See the Economist, December 14, 2002, p. 28-29. In the past, W3C developed HTML (for Hypertext Mark-up
Language) used to design web pages.
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